Uncertainty and risk are fundamental to explaining stability and change in partner selection and aspiration performance feedback models, respectively. The inherent uncertainty and risk in partnerships leads organizational decision makers to prefer partners in their local networks; those with which they have either past direct or indirect ties. Performance feedback models suggest, however, that organizations' performance relative to historical and social aspiration levels may prompt their decision makers to accept the uncertainty and risk of partnering with strangers. In an analysis of Canadian investment banks, we find that partner selection is influenced greatly by performance feedback, and that banks experiencing performance differentials relative to their own historical and relative performance are more likely to partner with strangers, while those experiencing performance near aspiration levels are likely to reproduce their prior relationships. Our findings suggest that performance feedback models offer a powerful account of the conditions provoking organizations' decision makers to opt for new partners, and a cogent analytic foundation for those interested in constructing dynamic models of interorganizational network change.
Introduction
The strategic alliance and networks literatures are dominated by the idea that organizations' positions in interorganizational networks can be a powerful source of competitive advantage. The web of partnerships that organizations spin embed them in various network positions, offering network-based advantages in terms of differential access to and control of scarce information, skills, knowledge and other resources flowing within the network (Burt, 1992; Podolny, 1993; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996) .
Network positions and advantages are the result of partner choices organizations make in the network. Research on partner selection, which examines the factors leading one organization to partner with another, thus lays out the building blocks of networks, network positions and networkbased advantages. This now substantial body of work is based on the premise that the decision to enter into a collaborative interorganizational relationship is fundamentally an uncertain and risky one plagued with imperfect information about potential partners' capabilities and reliability (Gulati, 1995; Oxley, 1997) . This research emphasizes how uncertainty about the reliability, trustworthiness and capabilities of potential partners makes selection of more familiar, past partners and partners' partners less risky and more likely than choosing relative strangers with which they have little or no prior direct or indirect experience (Anand and Piskorski, 2000; Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Li and Rowley, 2002) . From this perspective, organizations' relationships accumulate into local networks that are repositories of information useful for reducing the uncertainty and risks of collaboration (Gulati, 1995) . The more an organization's local network internalizes information about potential partners the more the organization's decision makers rely on the local network to guide their partnering choices, rather than engaging in riskier and more uncertain search for possible partners beyond their local network (Baum and Ingram, 2002) . As a result, organizations tend to build relatively stable, densely interconnected local networks in which there are many relationships among their partners (Walker et al., 1997) .
Partner selection research thus highlights key processes promoting stability in interorganizational partnerships and networks, but supplies few insights into the forces driving partner and network change. Although research provides robust evidence of decision makers' uncertainty and risk-averse preference for their own and their partners' past partners, this does not mean that decision makers inevitably reproduce their organizations' past relationships (Baker, Faulkner and Fisher, 1998; Baum, Shipilov and Rowley, 2003; Palmer, 1983) . Indeed, research on the advantages of collaborating with non-redundant partners -those outside the dense local network -indicates that the benefits provided by such partnerships may often outweigh the additional uncertainty and risk they entail (Burt, 1992; Rowley and Baum, 2002; Rowley Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000; Ahuja, 2000) . Moreover, an over reliance on embedded ties within local networks can harm organizational performance (Uzzi, 1996) . The question remains, however, as to the conditions that will prompt organizations to override the risk and uncertainty avoidance logic that leads them to rely repeatedly on their local network partners and to instead pursue collaborative relationships with more unfamiliar organizations.
Learning theory seems particularly germane to specifying the conditions under which organizations are likely to accept the risk and uncertainty partnering with unfamiliar and unknown organizations. A central idea in learning theory -that organizations learn from their experience by making changes conditional on their performance history (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988) -has led to an interest in how organizations' performance affects the likelihood of different types of change (March, 1988; Miller and Chen, 1994; Ocasio, 1995) . One important idea behind this research is that because the results of changing are, as a rule, less well known than the results of not changing, change entails risk (Greve, 1998; March, 1991) . Another is that risk taking is goal oriented and that decision makers' actions differ depending on whether their performance is above or below some goal or aspiration level (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Milliken and Lant, 1991; March and Shapira, 1992) , relative to either their own historical performance or the performance of their peers (Greve, 1998) . Decision makers appear willing to engage in riskier types of changes when they fail to achieve a goal or aspiration level (Greve, 1998; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Partner selection research and learning theory thus share a common emphasis on uncertainty and risk. By concentrating on uncertainty and risk reduction as an underlying logic, however, partner selection research lacks learning theory's attention to the conditions under which organizations undertake risky change. In this study we exploit this shared emphasis by examining how an organization's performance affects the likelihood of its decision makers engaging in the riskier and more uncertain choice of selecting strangers, with which they have little or no prior direct or indirect experience, as partners. Thus, while we take seriously the partner selection perspective, which highlights the role of uncertainty and risk avoidance as well as factors creating partner choice inertia, we also introduce performance feedback models based on learning theory to better understand factors affecting change.
Typically, in research on performance feedback effects, aspiration levels are measured in terms of metrics salient to organizations' decision makers, including market share (e.g., Greve, 1998) , revenue growth (e.g., Mezias, Chen and Murphy, 2002) or return on assets (e.g., Fleming and Bromiley, 2003; Singh 1986 ). Because our focus is on partner selection, however, we also attend to network performance indicators. In particular, we treat organizations' network status positions as performance indicators. Empirical research indicates both that status enhances access to market rewards and that organizations are status-seeking in their partnering behavior (Podolny, 1993; Chung et al, 2000; Li and Rowley, 2002) . Combined with this evidence, learning theory suggests that decision makers in organizations interpret their network status performance by comparing the advantages of their current network position with their own historical position and the position advantages of other firms. Conceptualizing status as a resource and performance indicator is quite common; few studies, however, have yet to focus on the performance feedback effects of status differentials.
We test our ideas in a study of all underwriting syndicates formed by investment banks in Canada between 1952 and 1990 . This empirical setting provides an opportunity to examine how performance feedback influences these banks' partnering decisions because the long history of syndicate ties enables a longitudinal observation of each bank's performance and partnering decisions. In addition, partnering is not only a common practice in the investment banking industry, but these relationships act as conduits to underwriting opportunities and contribute greatly to banks' status and performance (Podolny, 1993; Rowley and Baum, 2002) . Thus, syndicate ties are important resources banks use to achieve their goals, namely, maximizing underwriting fees.
Uncertainty and Risk in Partner Selection
Although partnerships can be a valuable source of competitive advantage, research on partner selection emphasizes that there is considerable risk and uncertainty associated with entering new partnerships (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Kogut, 1988; Oxley, 1997) . Prior to forming a partnership, organizations possess imperfect information regarding their potential partners' capabilities and willingness to cooperate. This imperfect information about potential partners raises search costs and the risk of exposure to opportunistic behavior.
To reduce search costs and alleviate risks of opportunism associated with partnerships, organizations tend to create stable, preferential relationships characterized by trust and rich information exchange with specific partners (Gulati, and Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati, 1995; Chung et al, 2000; Li and Rowley, 2002; Uzzi, 1996) . Prior direct ties provide channels through which each partner can learn about the competencies and reliability of the other, amplifying trust and diminishing uncertainty associated with future ties (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995) . Thus, by repeating past ties organizations are able to mitigate the imperfect information problem in partner selection, gaining direct knowledge of their partners' capabilities and reliability.
Organizations tied to a common partner can also utilize reliable indirect information about each other from that partner (Baker, 1990; Uzzi, 1996) . In this case, the frame of reference shifts from direct ties and communication to indirect channels of information, reputation, and referral.
When two organizations share a common partner it also signals that both are regarded as trustworthy partners by the same organization. Third-party endorsements thus serve as a 'second-best' option to direct experience, providing significant savings in terms of time and resources needed to identify potential partners and build new relationships (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1996) . Such common ties can also promote good behavior by facilitating information flow that fosters a concern for local reputation and enable collective sanctioning (Burt and Knez, 1995; Rowley, 1997; Walker et al., 1997) .
A history of direct and indirect cooperative experience thus becomes a unique source of information about various potential partners' capabilities and reliability and lowers the uncertainty and risk of interorganizational collaboration. For example, syndication of investment is crucial to venture capital (VC) firms' performance. The search for business ideas to fund requires substantial time and is riddled with uncertainty. VCs must assess many projects before identifying one or a few that might provide high returns. Co-investing with other VCs permits pooling of evaluations and judgments, which reduces the risk in screening as well as minimizing the winner's curse (Stuart and Sorenson, 2001) . Moreover, investments require extensive monitoring and active management involvement by VCs to appraise the venture's value for future investment rounds. So, joining syndicates can reduce VCs' search as well as monitoring costs. Despite these benefits, the VC syndication process is fraught with uncertainty and risk. In particular, syndication is subject to adverse selection (VCs in prior funding rounds have superior information on the investment's value) and moral hazard (free riding on the search and monitoring efforts of other syndicate members) problems associated with entry of new VCs into an existing syndicate. As Anand and Piskorski (2000) show, however, past direct ties and common alters help VCs overcome these information asymmetries and free rider incentives, making syndication systematically more likely among VCs with dyadic and triadic ties.
Partner selection research thus suggests that organizations' concerned with mitigating the uncertainty and risk associated with entering collaborative arrangements results in the formation of dense, relatively stable, local networks that are a repository of information on the capabilities and reliability of prospective partners (Kogut, Shan and Walker, 1992; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . The more the local network internalizes information about potential partners the more organizations rely on it for cues about future partnerships and, by corollary, the more organizations' access to capable and reliable partners depends on the identities of their own past partners (Ahuja 2000; Chung et al., 2000; Gulati 1995; Walker, Kogut and Shan 1997) .
Three broad implications emerge from research on partner selection. First, partnerships and the larger networks they constitute tend to be stable relatively over time as decision makers enter their organizations into repeated relationships with prior partners. Second, and for the same reason, local interorganizational networks tend to be 'cliquey,' with organizations sharing many common partners with each other. Third, compared to maintaining or repeating ties with past partners and partners' partners, initiating ties with new partners -strangers -located outside an organization's local network is an uncertain and risky business. Thus, while providing substantial insight into the partner selection process, this research offers limited insight into the conditions that prompt organizations' decision makers to accept the uncertainty and risk of selecting partners from outside their local networks, and thus, little insight into network change. This is an important gap in our understanding.
Learning theory, and in particular performance feedback models predicting decision makers' propensity for risky change, are well suited to specifying the conditions under which organizations' decision makers are likely to venture into the risky and uncertain realm of partnering with strangers.
Performance Aspirations and Risky Organizational Change
Models of aspirations are central to research on organizational change and risk-taking (Bromiley, 1991; Greve, 1998; Lant, 1992; March and Shapira, 1992) . Decision makers are more likely to engage in risky change when their organizations fail to attain a goal or aspiration level (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; March, 1988 ). An aspiration level is a reference point that identifies the boundary between perceived success and failure. Performance aspirations, defined on various metrics, can arise from two types of comparisons.
The first is a comparison with the organization's own performance history (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1981) . An organization's recent performance history is a benchmark against which the organization evaluates its current performance. Its aspiration level adapts with a lag to past performance (Cyert and March, 1963; Lant 1992, March and Simon, 1958) , rising when the organization's performance increases and falling with performance downturns.
The second is a social comparison with the performance of others (Festinger, 1954; Cyert and March, 1963) , in which other organizations' performance is used to set an aspiration level.
Although limited, available research indicates that salience, ease of observation and comparability are important factors affecting how decision makers form reference group of other organizations used for social comparison (Baum, Li and Usher, 2000; Greve, 1998; Haveman, 1993; Lant and Baum, 1995; Reger and Huff, 1993; Porac et al., 1995) .
As Greve (1998) notes, historical and social aspiration levels can be seen as results of the decision maker behaving as an intuitive scientist (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) : available data are combined with simple processing rules to create an expectation of future performance, which sets the aspiration level. Aspiration levels are the result of boundedly rational decision makers trying to simplify information processing and performance evaluation by transforming a continuous outcome measure into a discrete measure of success or failure (March and Simon, 1958) . The simplified information processing obtained by categorizing outcomes as successes and failures means that risk taking is highly sensitive to performance outcomes relative to aspiration levels (Greve, 1998) . In particular, risk taking behavior depends on whether the organization's performance is (1) distant from or near aspiration levels and (2) above or below aspirations (March and Shapira, 1992) .
Learning theory suggests that when performance is near aspiration levels, organization tend to be risk seeking below and risk averse above their targets (Bromiley, 1991; March and Shipira, 1992) . Because organizations' decision makers react more strongly to threats than opportunities, performance below aspiration levels is more likely to trigger risky change (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986 ). Performance slightly above aspiration levels reinforce lessons drawn from earlier experience, while unsatisfactory outcomes call existing practices and strategies into question (Levitt and March, 1988; Lant and Mezias, 1992) . Thus, performance evaluation is not a monotonic function of the level of performance but, rather, has a steeper slope in the failure range -i.e., small failures may loom larger than small successes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Organizations that are more distant from aspiration levels -above or below -engage in different risk-taking behaviors than when their performance is close to targets. Decision makers in an organization performing slightly below its aspiration level are less likely to pursue risky change than when they are far below the target: They need only small improvements to reach that level and thus focus on minor or incremental changes that promise small improvements. An organization performing far below its aspiration level, however, cannot achieve acceptable performance through local search and incremental change. Instead, decision makers must increase their emphasis on more exploratory search and risky changes that offer the possibility of raising the organization's performance to its aspiration level.
Performance far below aspirations is thus an engine for 'problem-driven search,' which confronts the status quo, draws attention to potential problems, and stimulates exploration of new practices, strategies and courses of action. The anxiety of poor performance motivates decisionmakers to risk change. In contrast, performance near aspirations tends to promote refinement of current practices and strategies (Miller, 1990 (Miller, , 1999 Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) . A range of studies provides evidence that poor performance leads to organizational change (e.g., Lant, Milliken and Batra, 1992) , while satisfactory performance does not (e.g., Singh, 1986; March and Shapira, 1992) . Greve (1998) , for example, showed that U.S. radio station chains were more likely to alter their market strategies when their performance was below market share aspiration levels than when their performance was near their aspiration levels.
Aspiration models also predict that performance far above aspirations has a similar affect to performance far below. In the study just noted, for example, Greve (1998) found not only that radio station chains were more likely to undertake strategic change when their performance was below than near market share aspirations, but that such change was more likely when their performance was above market share aspiration levels as well. This prediction stems from the idea that organizations performing above aspirations may enjoy slack resources that free decision makers to work on new ideas and develop promising ideas previously placed on the 'back burner' (Levinthal and March, 1981) . Although some types of high performance may not create slack resources (Greve, 2003) , decision-makers may still be more likely to pursue risky change because the downside risk is mitigated by the size of the performance drop required for them to fall below aspiration levels. When performance is just above aspiration levels, in contrast, decision makers may tend to frame the outcomes of risky change in terms of falling below aspirations, and so not undertake them to avoid the loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Taken together, problem-driven and slack search suggest that the likelihood of organizations engaging in risky change is positively related to the distance their current performance is from aspiration levels (albeit the slopes of relationships with risky change may be different above and below aspiration levels).
To this point, we have treated performance aspirations as a single construct, and not distinguished between historical and social performance aspirations. These two performance referents may, however, in combination influence an organization's change behavior differently than either alone (Greve, 1998) . Most intriguing are situations in which decision makers receive 'mixed' performance feedback; that is, when historical and social aspirations on opposite sides of their respective aspiration levels.
Problem-Driven Slack Search. First, an organization performing above competitors, but below its own past performance, may feel pressure to improve performance to avoid the possibility of falling behind its competitors. Performing well above social aspiration levels, organizations build expectations to maintain their relative positions within their referent groups and a decrease in performance relative to its own historical aspirations may signal that their favorable social positions are not sustainable. Moreover, organizations performing above social aspirations are likely to have more resources available to pursue risky change that is motivated by performance below historical aspiration levels. Thus, organizations above social, but below historical aspirations are likely to have an incentive and possess the means to engage in 'problem-driven slack search' such that the positive influence of performance above social aspirations on the likelihood of risky change is enhanced when the organization is performing below historical aspirations. Such search is compatible with the idea that attention shifts depending on the performance relative to different goals, with a tendency to focus on performance criteria below (rather than above) aspiration levels (March and Shapira, 1992) . Performance below historical aspirations directs their attention to conduct more extensive search in fear of being outcompeted by competitors. Consistent with problem-driven slack search, in recent study, Fleming and Bromiley (2003) found that, among U.S. firms granted at least one patent between 1975 and 1999, 'breakthrough' patents were most likely to be invented by firms that were doing very well, relative to their industry, and at the same time, very poorly relative to their own historical performance.
Mobility-Driven Slack Search. Second, the inverse relationship -performance below social, but above historical aspirations -will produce a similar influence on decision-makers' behavior. Although below social aspirations, performance above historical aspirations increase decision-makers confidence that they can compete against the top performers in their referent groups (Lant, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1981) . While problem-driven slack search is motivated by a fear of falling behind competitors, 'mobility-driven slack search' is based on the decision maker's perception that the organization can improve performance relative to its referent group or even stretch to a new referent group of higher performers. This optimism is generated by improved performance relative to historical aspiration levels. On the one hand, performance below competitors motivates decision makers to conduct problem-driven search in hope to either catch up with their peer groups or compete with other higher performers. On the other, performance above the past performance can raise historical aspiration levels and boost decision makers' confidence that their actions will lead to higher performance relative to others. Thus, performance above historical aspirations has the effect of intensifying the effect performance below social aspirations has on the likelihood of risky change. Baum and Lant (2003) , for example, find that Manhattan hotel managers who reported their hotel's performance exceeded their expectations were more likely to identify a larger number of largersized hotels as competitors. This suggests that for organizations performing below social aspirations, high performance relative to historical aspirations may trigger 'mobility-driven slack search,' as an organization's decision makers seek to convert its improving performance into a better industry position.
Hypotheses: Performance Relative to Aspirations and Partnering with Strangers
Uncertainty and risk are fundamental to explaining stability and change in partner selection and aspiration performance feedback models, respectively. The inherent uncertainty and risk in partnerships leads organizational decision makers to prefer partners in their local networks; those with which they have either past direct or indirect relations. Performance feedback models suggest, however, that organizational performance relative to historical and social aspiration levels may prompt organizations' decision makers to abandon uncertainty and risk avoidance as their primary motivation for partner selection, and instead, chose to accept the uncertainty and risk of partnering with strangers in order to enhance their performance.
Relating problem-driven and slack search to the relative risk of choosing new, unfamiliar partners rather than past partners or their partners suggests the following three hypotheses relating an organization's performance relative to historical and social aspirations to the likelihood that its decision makers with accept the uncertainty and risk of partnering with a stranger:
Problem-Driven Search
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): When below aspirations, performance relative to historical aspirations is positively related to the probability of selecting new partners.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b):
When below aspirations, performance relative to social aspirations is positively related to the probability of selecting new partners.
Slack Search
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): When above aspirations, performance relative to historical aspirations is positively related to the probability of selecting new partners.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): When above aspirations, performance relative to social aspirations is positively related to the probability of selecting new partners.
Problem-Driven Slack Search
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): When above social aspirations, performance below historical aspirations amplifies the positive relationship between performance relative to social aspirations and the probability of selecting new partners.
Mobility-Driven Slack Search
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): When above historical aspirations, performance below social aspirations amplifies the positive relationship between performance relative to historical aspirations and the probability of selecting new partners.
Performance Metrics: Market Share and Network Status Aspirations
Organizational decision makers attend to different performance metrics, depending on factors including their personal and organizational goals (Cyert and March, 1963) and their attention patterns (Ocasio, 1997) . Typically, an organization's aspiration level has been operationalized in terms of traditional performance metrics attended to by organizational decision makers such as market share (e.g., Greve, 1998) , revenue growth (e.g., Mezias, Chen and Murphy, 2002) or return on assets (e.g., Fleming and Bromiley, 2003; Singh 1986 ). Here, we adopt market share as our traditional performance metric, given its significance in this regard to our empirical setting, the investment banking industry (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Eccles and Crane, 1988; Maginson and Weiss, 1991) . Market share performance relative to aspirations may lead investment banks to seek out new partners as a means of forming syndicate arrangements to improve their market share performance (Podolny, 1993) . Network research suggests that partnering with strangers can enhance financial performance because such relationships create opportunities for organizations to broker resources flows across their unconnected partners (Burt, 1992; Rowley and Baum, 2002) and avoid the performance constraining effects of over-embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996) .
Because we are examining partnering decisions, which have direct implications for network structures and positions, we also consider network status as a performance metric attended to by decision makers. The network positions resulting from organizations' partnerships create a status order in which access to market rewards (e.g., higher revenues, higher prices, greater market share) are mediated by the centrality of the network position (Bonacich, 1987; Borgatti and Everett, 1994; Podolny, 1993) . Firms occupying central network positions enjoy access to timely information, referrals and resources (Powell et al., 1996) and gain control benefits by acting as brokers between disconnected partners that rely on them to facilitate exchange flows across the network (Burt, 1992) .
Research indicates that network status influences access to market rewards and partner choices significantly (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Bonacich, 1987; Borgatti and Everett, 1994; Chung et al., 2000; Li and Rowley, 2002) . Being associated with higher status partners boosts an organization's own position in the status hierarchy, while being associated with lower status actors will detract from it because relationships provide information cues about each partner's quality (Faulkner 1983; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Stuart et al., 1999) .
Research also suggests that the advantages of status lead organizations to be status seeking.
Organizations tend to interact with others of similar status (Chung et al., 2000; Gould, 2002) , with higher status organizations are reluctant to partner with those of lower status since such affiliations may diminish their prestige (Podolny, 1993) , and lower status organizations eager to increase their rank by partnering with higher status players Podolny, 1993; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) . Low-status organizations engage in strategic behavior, including bargaining, exchange, and coercion (Brager and Holloway 1978; Willer and Anderson 1981) , or co-sponsorship and cooptation (Sharpe 1985) , to establish and maintain ties with higher status organizations Leik 1992; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) .
Because lower status organizations seek status-enhancing relationships and high status organizations tend to protect their rankings, network status performance differentials, both historical and social, may provoke organizations' decision makers to rethink and alter their pattern of interorganizational relationships (Baum and Ingram, 2002) . Therefore, in addition to testing H1-H3 in terms of a traditional performance metric, market share, we also test them using aspiration specifications based on of organizations' historical and relative network positions measured in terms of network status.
Data and Methods
We study the relationship between organizations' performance and propensity to select new partners, using data covering all securities offerings in Canada from 1952 to 1990, inclusively. The
Record of New Issues, published yearly since 1952 by Financial Data Group in Toronto, was the main data source and provided the following information: issuer's name, date of issue, name of lead issuing investment bank and co-lead investment banks, security type, value of issue proceeds, and issue price and volume. In 1952, 19 investment banks participated in 27 underwriting syndicates in Canada. Over the observation period, the number of syndicates grew rapidly, and by 1989, 83 banks participated in 422 syndicates. Thus, although life-histories for a small number of banks are leftcensored (i.e., begin prior to our observations), our data covers the period during which raising equity in the capital markets superceded bank debt as the dominant mode of corporate financing (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999) . Our comprehensive network data and longitudinal research design permit us to avoid the problem of network boundary setting (Doreian and Woodard, 1992) , and to model partner selection over a period of time sufficient to yield meaningful variation in network structure and composition.
Investment Banking Syndicates and Networks
Partnership among banks in underwriting syndicates is a good setting for our analysis of partner selection. Investment banks act as financial intermediaries linking issuers (organizations) wishing to raise funds on capital markets to investors. They add value to corporations raising capital in primary markets by effectively pricing and placing their issues. The industry is characterized as "relationship-oriented" because banks commonly collaborate in underwriting deals. Relationships are not only a common practice but also a vital resource, as ties are conduits to underwriting opportunities and contribute to banks' reputations (Podolny, 1993) .
Investment banks take on two distinct intermediary roles -lead manager and co-lead manager -in the underwriting process that link issuers wishing to raise funds to investors. The underwriting process begins with an issuer choosing a bank as lead manager to oversee the underwriting responsibilities. In many cases, the lead manager invites additional investment banks to participate as co-lead managers in an underwriting syndicate as a means of spreading risk and reaching a wider range of investors for the issue.
1 Thus, in the lead manager role, a bank must select co-lead managers to form an underwriting syndicate, and in the co-lead manager role it must decide whether or not to accept invitations to participate in underwriting syndicates. In aggregate, these two types of partnering decisions -forming and joining underwriting syndicates -generate the investment banking industry network, and the positions of particular banks within it.
We constructed interorganizational networks for each observation year based on banks underwriting syndicate memberships. We constructed networks from adjacency matrices capturing the number of times each bank participated in a syndicate with each other bank for four-year moving , 1952-55, 1953-56, 1954-57, etc…) . We used four-year windows for three reasons.
First, syndicate ties represent only the visible manifestation of relationships; banks participating in syndicates together in any given year are also likely to interact in other ways with each other in years proximate to the syndicate. Second, because syndicates can remain intact up to six months or more prior to the date of the offering, syndicates that conclude in any given year may have been formed in prior years. And third, the four-year window permits us to gauge more accurately the strength of network ties by incorporating information on repeated ties over a number of years.
Constructing the network based on four-year moving periods should thus permit us to represent the network more reliably and accurately.
Dependent Variable and Estimation
We pooled the yearly data and estimated a single model of banks' partner selection where the dependent variable is the proportion of a bank's partners in the current year that were strangersthat is, neither partners of its own nor of its partners during the prior four year window (i.e., four years). Pooling repeated observations on the same organizations is likely to violate the assumption of observation independence, resulting in autocorrelation of the model's residuals, and rendering OLS estimates inefficient. Therefore, we estimated random-effects GLS models, which correct for autocorrelation of disturbances (Greene, 1993) .
Performance Aspiration Variables
Historical Aspirations. We specified historical aspirations based on two performance metrics. First, to account for standard performance aspiration level effects, we measured historical aspiration levels for each bank based on its market share. Market share is frequently used to measure investment bank performance (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Maginson and Weiss, 1991) . Market share is an important performance metric for investment banks because their success depends on their ability to provide issuers and investors with the market insights gained from their involvement in many deals (Podolny, 1993) . As such, market share is an important corporate objective in investment banking.
As well, because underwriting fees and margins are relatively constant across the industry (averaging roughly seven percent), banks' performance is strongly tied to market share (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 1999) . We measured a bank's market share for a given year based on the dollar value (inflation adjusted) of the syndicates in which it participated in that year. Based on norms identified through our interviews with banks managers, we allocated 50% of the underwriting value to the lead bank, and split the remaining value among the co-lead banks equally.
2
To test for the predicted effects of network status performance aspirations, we computed historical aspiration levels using Bonacich's (1987) normalized eigenvector centrality to measure the status and information access of banks in the industry networks. We computed a bank's centrality for each four-year network. Given an adjacency matrix A, the status of bank i was computed as αΣA ijcj , where α is a parameter reciprocal of an eigenvalue of a matrix A. To normalize the measure, we divided it by the maximum possible difference in each four-year network (Borgatti et al., 1999) . We used this normalization to facilitate comparison between status scores across the 2 Although our interviews suggested that the lead bank would almost always assume at least 50% of a deal's value, there may be some variance. Therefore, we computed three alternative specifications of banks' market share by equally splitting the value of deals among all syndicate members, and by assigning 25% or 75% of the syndicate's value to the lead manager. Since the average correlations among these different specifications was 0.98, we used the 50-50 specification.
different four-year networks. Given this specification, an investment bank's status is a function of the number and the status of the banks with which it forms underwriting syndicates. In turn, the status of these partners is the function of the number and the status of their syndicate partners, and so on. Consistent with the status ordering observed in other studies of the investment banking industry (Podolny 1993 (Podolny , 2001 , the distribution of status is skewed, indicating that there are many more lowthan high-status banks.
For each performance metric a bank's historical aspiration level was specified as an exponentially weighted moving average of its experienced performance (Levinthal and March, 1981; Greve, 1998; March, 1988; Lant, 1992) . More formally:
where P is the performance metric (i.e., market share or network status), i is the focal bank, t is time period, and α is a weight given to performance, with high value updating the aspiration level quickly, implying an emphasis on the recent performance. To assess the sensitivity of our results to the value of the updating parameter, we constructed and estimated aspiration levels on each of the performance metrics for three values of α: .25, .50 and .75. For the analysis, the key variables for testing H1a and H2a are measures of performance relative to historical aspirations, defined as the value of the performance metric minus its historical aspiration.
A variety of functional forms, mainly differing in whether the probability decreases faster or slower above or below the aspiration level, have been proposed for the relationship between aspiration level performance and the probability of organizational change (see, e.g., Greve, 1998 Social Aspirations. As a starting point, we defined a bank's social aspiration level based on the current performance of other all other banks in the network. Here, the reference group is all other banks in the industry network, and the aspiration level is set to their mean performance. Thus,
where j is another bank, and Ν is the number of other banks, j. As with historical aspirations, we computed social aspiration levels based on market share and centrality.
For the analysis, the key variables for testing H1b and H2b are again relative performance measures, defined as the value of the performance metric minus its social aspiration. To allow for different slopes for values above and below aspirations, we again split the relative social performance variable into two variables, Social Aspiration Performance >0 and Social Aspiration Performance <0 defined identically to the historical aspiration variables above, and for ease of interpretation, we reverse-coded Social Aspiration Performance <0 so its values were positive.
Clearly the identity of the reference group can be specified in a more fine-grained way; but as a baseline the industry mean seemed a good place to start. As noted above, salience, ease of observation and comparability appear to be important factors affecting managers' formation of reference groups for social comparison. To examine the possibility that bank managers adopted a more refined reference group, we focused on comparability, narrowing the it by localizing in terms of similarity in 1) size, defined in terms of deal volume (i.e., inflation-adjusted dollar value of a bank's deals in a given year), and 2) role specialization, defined in terms of a bank's emphasis on leading versus co-leading syndicates (i.e., proportion of a bank's deals in year for which it acted as lead). Specifically, we computed alternative specifications of social aspirations as:
where S is a bank's size or specialization, i is the focal bank, j is another bank, and Ν is the number of other banks, j. In equation (3), the more dissimilar the size or role specialization of banks i and j, the larger the absolute value of (S it -S jt ), and so the smaller the contribution of (P jt ) to overall social aspiration. As with the baseline social aspiration (equation 2) the variable of interest is relative social performance (i.e., the performance metric minus its social aspiration) and we split the relative social performance variables based on equation (3) Although H3a and H3b only make predictions regarding the third and fourth of these interaction terms, respectively, we estimate the full set to avoid possible specification error when testing H3. Greve's (1998) analysis suggests that performance above or below both aspirations simultaneously may have mutually reinforcing effects on banks' partner choices.
Control Variables
A variety of organizational and industry level factors may also influence the propensity of investment banks to partner with strangers.
For each bank, we controlled for recent patterns of partnering by including separate counts of the number of ties it established with past partners, partners' partners, and strangers during the prior four-year network window. Additionally, we included a count of the number of past partners it cut ties with during the prior four-year network window. We also controlled for each bank's size, defined as the inflation-adjusted dollar value of a bank's deals in a given year (logged to normalize the distribution), and lead specialization, defined as the proportion of a bank's deals in a year for which it acted as lead manager. Larger banks and those specializing in leading syndicates may differ in their propensity and ability to engage strangers. For example, because lead banks invite others to co-lead underwriting syndicates, while co-leads accept or decline their invitations, lead banks should have greater discretion in partner selection (Rowley and Baum, 2002) . The bank size and lead specialization variables were each lagged one year to avoid simultaneity problems.
At the industry level, we controlled for the number of banks active in underwriting syndicates, as well as the total number of syndicates and inflation-adjusted dollar value of all deals in a given year (logged to normalize the distribution). These variables control for possible effects of competition for partners and environmental munificence, which may make it more or less likely that a bank will partner with strangers. All industry level variables were also lagged one year.
Finally, to control for decade-specific differences, we entered fixed effects for deals taking place in 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s , excluding the 1980s variable from the analysis as the comparison period.
Descriptive statistics and correlations for all study variables are given in Table 1 . In general, the correlations among the independent variables are low to moderate, only one reaching or exceeding .60 (36% shared variance). Such levels of multicollinearity among explanatory variables can result in less precise parameter estimates (i.e., larger standard errors) for the correlated variables but will not bias parameter estimates (Greene, 1993; Kennedy, 1992) . So, although this does not pose a serious estimation problem, it can make it more difficult to draw inferences about the effects of adding particular variables to the models. Therefore, when building our models, we followed a strategy of estimating hierarchically nested models to check that multicollinearity was not causing less precise parameter estimates, and suppressing the significance of some variables (Kmenta, 1971) . We detected no evidence of multicollinearity materially affecting our estimation.
Insert Table 1 about here. Table 2 presents random-effect GLS regression estimates of investment banks' propensity to establish syndicate ties with strangers -that is, neither banks nor their partners had participated in a syndicate with during the past 4 years. Model 1 is a baseline that includes bank-and industry-level control variables. Models 2a-c add the specifications of historical aspirations based on the different values of the depreciation factor, α, as indicated. Models 3a-c add the specifications of social aspirations based on the industry mean, and means weighted by similarity in role specialization and size. Coefficient estimates are quite similar across the three specifications for each variable, however the coefficients for historical aspirations based on α = .5 (Model 2b) and for social aspirations based on the size-similarity weighted measure (Model 3c) are more efficient. Consequently, for the remainder of the analysis, we focus on estimates based on these specifications.
Results

Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.
Model 4 in Table 3 presents coefficient estimates combining the historical and social aspirations variables from Models 2b and 3c. The estimates in Model 4 provide broad support for both the problem-driven and slack search hypotheses. Supporting the problem driven search hypotheses, H1a and H1b, the significant positive market share coefficients for social and historical aspiration performance <0 indicate that performance below social and historical market share aspirations raised the propensity of banks to partner with strangers.
The slack search hypotheses, H2a and H2b, are also supported for market share, the significant positive coefficients for social and historical aspiration performance >0 indicating that performance above social and historical market share aspirations also raised the propensity of banks to undertake the risks of partnering with strangers. These results are consistent with the traditional aspiration performance literature, which measures performance based on traditional metrics (e.g., Fleming and Bromiley, 2003; Greve, 1998; Mezias, Chen and Murphy, 2002; Singh 1986 ).
Controlling for effects of market share aspiration performance, however, do network performance aspirations also affect the willingness of banks to take on the risks of partnering with strangers? The estimates for the network status aspiration performance variables indicate that they do but that the effects of social aspiration performance on slack search differ from theoretical predictions.
The network status performance results for problem-driven search parallel those for market share. The coefficients for both historical and social network status aspiration performance <0 are positive and significant, supporting H1a and H1b. Thus, the propensity of banks to partner with strangers was greater for banks performing below either their historical or social network status aspirations.
The network status performance results for slack search differ from those for market share, however. Consistent with H2a, the coefficient for Network Status Historical Aspiration Performance >0 is significant and positive. Thus, as with market share, the propensity of banks to partner with strangers was greater for banks performing above their network status historical aspirations. In contrast to H2b, however, the coefficient for Network Status Social Aspiration Performance >0 is significant and negative. This means that the propensity of banks to partner with strangers was lower for banks performing above their network status social aspirations. Figure 1 shows the results for Model 4 in Table 3 graphically. In the figure, the horizontal axis in each panel indicates aspiration performance on the metric indicated and the vertical axis in each panel the estimated proportion of partners that are strangers relative to the situation where performance equals the aspiration level. The estimates for market share form a V-shape, with the proportion of strangers increasing as both historical and social aspiration performance move above or below the aspiration point. Notably, the slope below market share historical aspirations is roughly twice that for above historical aspirations, and the slope for is much steeper for performance below market share social aspirations than for performance above social aspirations. These differences in slope above and below aspirations, which comparison of means tests (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1970) indicate are significant (p < .001), are consistent with the idea that performance evaluation is not a linear function of the level of performance but, rather, has a steeper slope in the failure range (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The panel for network status aspiration performance shows a similar V-pattern for historical aspirations, however, a comparison of means test indicates that the slopes above and below historical aspiration levels are not significantly different. Compared to market share historical aspiration performance, the network status historical aspiration effect is about 50% smaller in the negative range and roughly equal in magnitude in the positive range. The plot of network status social aspiration effects shows the negative slopes both above and below aspiration levels, which contradicts H2b. The slope is again steeper for performance below aspirations, however, and a comparison of means test indicates significantly so. Compared to market share social aspiration performance, the network status social performance aspiration effect is again is about 50% smaller in the negative range, while similar in magnitude in the positive range.
Models 5-8 in Table 3 H3b, in contrast, was supported for market share but not network status performance. The significant positive Market Share Social <0 × Historical >0 interaction indicates that banks whose market share performance was below their competitors' but above their own past performance, were more likely to undertake risky partner change. Such "high-performing poor performers" were thus also more willing to partner with strangers, consistent with the idea that banks performing below social aspirations, but high relative to historical aspirations may engage in mobility-driven slack search, as the bank's managers seek to convert its improving performance trajectory into a more advantageous industry position.
The one other significant interaction term is also notable. Consistent with Greve's (1998) earlier findings, the significant positive interaction for Market Share Social <0 × Historical <0
indicates that performance below social and historical market share aspiration levels had mutually reinforcing effects on the propensity of banks to partner with strangers.
Insert Figure 2 about here. Figure 2 shows the effects of these complex interactions graphically. The panels on the left side of the figure show the estimated proportion of strangers as a function of both historical and social aspiration performance on the indicated metric, without considering the interaction effects.
As before, the estimated proportion of strangers is relative to the case where performance equals the aspiration level -in these figures for both social and historical simultaneously. These plots again show the V-shaped relationships for historical aspirations as well as reinforcing the generally larger magnitude effect of performance below aspirations on banks' propensity for risky change.
The panels on the right side of the figure add the interaction effects. The plot for network status aspiration performance clearly shows the problem-driven slack search: as network status historical performance falls below aspirations and network status social performance rises above aspirations, the proportion of strangers increases. The plot for market share aspirations also shows the effects of mobility-driven search by high-performing poor performers, as well as pure problemdriven search among banks performing below both aspiration levels. Notably, the effects of problem-and mobility-driven slack search on banks' propensity to partner with strangers are similar in magnitude to the effects of 'pure' problem-driven search (i.e., both social and historical aspiration performance below zero).
Discussion and Conclusion
This study was motivated by the observation that interorganizational partner selection research and learning theory share a common emphasis on uncertainty and risk. Uncertainty and risk reduction is the principal rationale offered to explain organizations' preference for their past partners and their partners' partners when forming new collaborations (e.g, Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) .
By concentrating on uncertainty and risk reduction as an underlying logic, however, partner selection research does not help specify the conditions under which organizations' decision makers are willing to take on the uncertainty and risk of new partners. To address this limitation, we employ performance feedback models from learning theory to specify the conditions under which organizations' decision makers are more or less likely to forego the certainty of the status quo to pursue risky change (March, 1988; Miller and Chen 1994; Ocasio, 1995) . Performance feedback models suggest that organizational performance relative to historical and social aspiration levels may prompt organizations' decision makers to abandon uncertainty and risk avoidance as a primary motivation for partner selection, and instead, chose to accept the uncertainty and risk of partnering with strangers in order to enhance their performance.
Our analysis of partner selection among Canadian investment banks shows a clear sensitivity to historical and relative performance feedback. Banks experiencing market share performance above and below their own historical performance and the performance of their competitors were more likely to engage in riskier partnering strategies, eschewing the partner-specific concerns that typically exert a strong influence on partner selection, while those experiencing performance near their market share aspiration levels were more likely to reproduce their prior relationships. These performance feedback effects are consistent with past empirical learning studies of problem-driven and slack search involving other types of risky change (e.g. Greve, 1998; Fleming and Bromiley, 2003) as well as simulation outcomes (e.g. March, 1988; March and Shapira, 1992) , and suggestive of the applicability of aspiration learning models to a broad range of organizational behavior.
Network status performance feedback also influenced investment banks' partnering behavior significantly, although the results differed somewhat from those associated with more traditional performance metrics. Network status performance below historical and social aspirations paralleled those for market share, and so the propensity of banks to partner with strangers was, as predicted, greater for those performing below either their historical or social network status aspirations. And, while the propensity of banks to partner with strangers was also greater for banks performing above their network status historical aspirations, there was no evidence that banks whose status was above their competitors' were more likely to engage in risky change. Banks occupying high status network positions preserved the status quo by forming relationships with their existing partners rather than with strangers.
Although contrary to our slack search hypothesis, this finding is consistent with the tendency toward homophily in a vertically differentiated network; that is, the likelihood of partnering increasing with similarity in status rank (Podolny, 1993) . Status homophily, which has been shown to play an influential role in partnerships among investment banks (Podolny, 1993) , predicts a reluctance of higher status organizations to partner with those of lower status since such affiliations may diminish their prestige, and an eagerness of lower status organizations to increase their rank by partnering with those of higher status. High status may thus constrain rather than increase a bank's propensity to pursue ties with strangers because the higher the bank's status, the more likely that partnering with a stranger will diminish its status. Our results suggest, however, that this constraint is attenuated for banks whose network status, while above their competitors', was below their own historical performance. Thus, while banks performing above network status social aspirations did not tend to engage in slack search, those among them experiencing network status historical performance shortfalls did tend to engage in problem-driven slack search. Overall, our findings indicate that banks' decision makers are attentive to network status performance differentials, both historical and social, and these differentials can provoke organizations' decision makers to rethink and alter their interorganizational relationships.
Taken together our theoretical analysis and empirical findings offer basic new insight into the dynamics of interorganizational networks. Interorganizational networks have been shown to change as a result of exogenous environmental factors reinforcing or loosening their structures (Madhavan et al., 1998) , as well as decision makers' and entrepreneurs' proactive steps to (re)shape their interorganizational relationships to match changing organizational demands (Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Steier and Greenwood, 2000) . Our study shows, in addition, how discrepancies between organizational performance and aspiration levels increased the reliance of propensity of decision makers to select partners from beyond their local network. Network structures and status positions may thus be destabilized by discrepancies between organizations' performance and their aspirations.
Our findings also point to potentially consequential second-order effects: As banks experiencing market share performance above and below their historical or social aspirations partner with strangers, the changes to the network structure resulting from these new partnerships may also alter status rankings, prompting further partner and network change. The magnitude of such secondorder effects will depend on the extent to which the new partnerships tend to reinforce or weaken the existing status order among organizations in the network.
Our finding that banks performing below social aspirations -both market share or network status -are more likely to partner with strangers suggests that smaller and more peripheral banks in the underwriting syndicate network exhibited the greatest tendency to partner with strangers. At the same time, however, we also found that banks performing above market share social aspirations and network status social aspirations (when also below network status historical aspirations), which indicates that larger and more central banks also had a tendency to partner with strangers. The Burt, 1992) . Notably, problem-driven slack search by high status organizations performing above network status social aspirations but below network status historical aspirations may also provide more peripheral organizations with opportunities to overcome the status stratification barriers that prevent them from gaining access to advantageous network positions. The characteristics of organizations partnering with strangers and the organizational performance trends in a network may thus serve as useful indicators of network stability. All these observations point to the importance of measuring network structures over time. Common, crosssectional network study designs cannot answer questions about why observed ties were created or maintained, or how long the observed network structure has persisted.
Our study suggests a number of promising directions for future research. Our analysis focuses on the effects of performance feedback on the propensity of the organization experiencing the performance to select riskier and more uncertain partners. It does not, however, consider the perspective of the partner, which must also accept the risk and uncertainty of the collaborative arrangements. Incorporating aspiration performance of potential partners would usefully extend the model we examined here. We wonder, for example, whether strangers that partner tend to have the same aspiration level performance -either above or below aspirations. If so, we wonder further whether this would help account for the emergence of tiered networks, and also under what circumstances organizations performing above aspiration levels would be willing to partner with ones performing below aspirations. This suggests that it may be fruitful to shift the focus of analysis from the organization level to the dyad level. Doing so will create significant challenges, however.
One of these is specification of the 'stranger risk set' for each organization -that is, identification of the strangers a given organization 'at risk' of partnering with at a particular point in time. This may be very difficult to achieve a priori.
Our findings showing performance feedback effects for network status aspirations open opportunities to identify and study additional non-traditional performance metrics that organizational decision makers attend to. While measures in performance feedback research tend to be outcome based (e.g., market share, revenue growth, return on assets), our network status measure is advantage based. If organizational decision makers regularly assess themselves on attributes that they view as sources of competitive advantage, and compare themselves to other competing organizations on these attributes, then it is possible that performance feedback on these attributes will have effects similar to those we found here for network status. Generalizing performance feedback effect in this way would offer a new way to theorize and research strategic organizational change and interorganizational competition.
Our results indicate that, for the investment banks we studied, performance relative to social aspirations, particularly performance below social aspirations, had much greater magnitude effects than historical aspirations on decision makers' propensity to partner with strangers. And, this was the case for both market share and network status performance. We wonder, more generally, about the relative influence of historical and social performance feedback. It may be, for example, that because market share and network status are inherently interorganizational (i.e., defined in reference to and by actions of other organizations), that social comparisons with others will dominate historical comparisons with oneself for these measures. This speculation is not supported by Greve's (1998) study of U.S. radio stations, which found similar magnitude effects on format change for social and historical aspiration performance measured in terms of market share.
Alternatively, it may be that because our dependent variable, partner selection, is inherently interorganizational that social comparisons with other organizations, regardless of the performance metric, will influence behavior more strongly than internal historical comparisons. It is also possible that decision makers in different organizations attend differentially to social and historical comparisons. Factors shaping the balance of attention between social and historical performance
feedback is an open research area.
Although we know a good deal about processes promoting stability in interorganizational partnerships and networks, we know too little about the processes promoting partner and network change in general, and the conditions that prompt organizations' decision makers to pursue collaborative relationships with more unfamiliar organizations. Our analysis indicates that performance feedback models from learning theory provide a powerful account of the conditions under which organizations' decision makers will accept the uncertainty and risks associated with selecting strangers, with which they have little or no prior direct or indirect experience, as partners.
We hope our analysis provides an analytic foundation for those interested in constructing dynamic models of interorganizational network change. 
